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When is Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology and the Comparative Efficiency of
Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection.
The nominal efficiency of a regulatory regime is determined by comparing its social costs and benefits;
the regime is nominally efficient if it produces benefits in excess of its costs. Thus, a regulatory regime
can be at once nominally efficient and relatively inefficient. A regulatory regime that is nominally
efficient in the early days of pollution-control efforts, when increments of environmental quality are
relatively cheap, may (but will not necessarily) grow less efficient over time - producing less return on
each dollar invested - as increments of environmental quality grow increasingly expensive. A regulatory
regime that is more efficient in one institutional and technological setting may be less efficient (or
inefficient) in another. In reality, however, this outcome will occur only under certain conditions;
specifically, when the regulatory regime as a whole is more efficient. The discussion begins, for the sake
of comparison, with a brief review of the "conventional" story of the Clean Air Act's regulatory regime.
In addition, in 1987 the EPA wrapped up a small-scale and temporary but highly successful experiment
in tradable rights to lead-content in gasoline. Like other institutions in society, those of environmental
protection (including the regulatory regime itself) tend to evolve slowly, incrementally, and
inconsistently. In large measure, the choice of regulatory regime depends on the goals and concerns of
policy-makers.
Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman

I. Introduction
It has become an article of faith among economists, legal scholars, and policy makers that
economic forms of regulation such as effluent taxes and emissions trading are inevitably more
efficient than traditional command-and-control regimes for environmental protection. Some
suggest that command-and-control regimes are not only less efficient but inherently inefficient,
implying that they naturally produce more social costs than benefits. n1 A few even go so far as
to equate command-and-control with "Soviet-style" regulation and "socialist central planning,"
implying that it is both endemically inefficient and democratically illegitimate. n2
[*888] This Article takes issue with the general portrayal of command-and-control
environmental regulations in the economic and legal literature. The prevailing view that
command-and-control is inevitably inefficient - or less efficient than alternative "economic
instruments" n3 such as effluent taxes and marketable pollution permits - is inaccurate both as a
matter of economic theory and experience. This Article argues that command-and-control
environmental regulations can be (and have been) nominally efficient, producing social benefits
in excess of their costs; indeed, they even can be (and have been) more efficient than alternative
"economic" approaches to regulation.
Standard economic accounts of command-and-control environmental regulations are insensitive
to the historical, technological, and institutional contexts that can determine the comparative
efficiency of alternative regulatory regimes. A regime that is nominally or relatively efficient in a
given set of historical, technological, and institutional contexts may be nominally or relatively
inefficient in another context. As Hodgson puts it, "What is "fit' is always relative to an
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environmental situation." n4 When analyzed with sensitivity to historical, technological, and
institutional contexts, command-and-control regulations are not, contrary to the prevailing
wisdom, invariably inefficient or necessarily less efficient than "economic" mechanisms for
environmental protection. Indeed, in some cases, given the marginal costs of pollution control,
technological constraints, and existing institutions, command-and-control [*889] can be the
most efficient means of achieving a society's environmental protection goals.
Section II of this Article reviews the empirical literature upon which others have relied to
condemn command-and-control regulation. The studies do not, as it happens, lead inexorably to
the conclusion that command-and-control is inevitably inefficient or even less efficient than
alternative "economic" approaches to regulation. Section III then sketches a dynamic model of
environmental protection that accounts for the changing marginal costs of environmental
protection over time, technological constraints, and institutions and institutional change. The
model is further elaborated in Section IV through a series of five stylized cases, which
demonstrate how alternative approaches to regulation are more or less efficient depending on
institutional and technological factors that affect overall regulatory costs. Section V then adds
empirical support by reviewing the history of the United States Clean Air Act. This Section
demonstrates how efficiencies can shift in response to institutional and technological evolution.
In the early years of federal air pollution control, congressional reliance on command-and control
regulations was nominally efficient and probably also relatively efficient, but recent
technological and institutional innovations made market-based alternatives feasible, and in some
cases efficiency-enhancing.
II. The Premature Burial of Command-and-Control: What the "Empirical" Studies Prove and Do
Not Prove
"Empirical" studies allegedly confirm the inherent inferiority of command-and-control
regulations. Tietenberg, for example, has summarized ten studies that he claims demonstrate vast
cost differentials between command-and-control regulations and least-cost alternatives. n5 In fact,
these studies prove rather less than he claims. In the first place, only one is actually "empirical";
n6
the others are simulations or predictive studies based on models. n7 The only truly empirical
study, an examination [*890] of control policies for meeting air quality standards in the Lower
Delaware Valley, does not conclude that market-based approaches are inevitably more efficient
than command-and-control. In fact, the "most striking" finding of the study is that

although the ambient quality permit policy [a market-based approach] was generally observed to
be the most efficient of the source control policies analyzed and the uniform percentage emission
reduction policy [a command-and-control approach] was most often the least efficient of those
analyzed, there were enough exceptions to these findings to be cautious about making
generalizations. Moreover, the two source control policies that have attracted and continue to
attract the most attention among environmental economists and policy analysts - the uniform
emissions charge and emission permit policies - were surprisingly erratic from an efficiency
perspective. The uniform emission charge policy in one case, for example, was the most efficient
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of the source control policies analyzed. In another case, it was the least efficient of those
analyzed, even more costly than the uniform percentage emission reduction policy. n8

Moreover, this and several of the other studies focus exclusively on compliance costs, ignoring
implementation and monitoring costs. n9
Among the studies that do consider administrative costs, the findings are mixed. For example,
although Palmer et al. find that "economic incentives impose lower costs on the economy as a
whole and offer far greater flexibility in both the timing and extent of emissions reduction," they
conclude that "no policy ranks first among all the dimensions of policy comparison."
Consequently, they do not "recommend a particular choice among the policy strategies." n10
Roach et al. conclude that although certain market-based approaches may, in theory, be more
efficient, one must account for the legal and political (i.e., institutional) context in which they
would operate. n11 Hahn and Noll go a step further, concluding that market-based approaches are
not invariably more efficient than command-and-control for institutional (mainly political)
[*891] reasons, as well as for reasons pertaining to the nature of specific pollution problems. n12
Similarly, Seskin et al. note:

It would be premature to conclude that the less costly [market-based] strategies ... would
necessarily be superior in practice to more traditional regulatory approaches. This follows from
the fact that the policy instruments needed to implement the less costly strategies may be
unavailable because of legal or political constraints, or may be so costly to administer as to offset
the potential savings in emissions control costs. n13

In other words, the "less costly" regulatory strategies may not be less costly after all. Perhaps
most interestingly of all, Maloney and Yandle suggest that "when information costs are
considered, one might argue that the development of clean air regulation since 1970 has actually
been the best possible approach" because

there are a number of practical problems associated with both plant standards and regionally
marketable permits. The monitoring question is most dominant. The technological basis of the
uniform percentage source standards has been itself the monitoring device. If the approved
technology was in place, and its working order documented, emission control was being
accomplished. With transferability, more direct measurement of emissions might be required. n14

These various empirical studies, far from demonstrating the inevitable superiority of market3

based approaches to pollution control, as Tietenberg has suggested, n15 show that conceivable
market-based approaches would in many cases perform more efficiently than command-andcontrol regulations, assuming certain institutional and economic circumstances. Meanwhile,
Tietenberg neglects empirical studies that demonstrate how command-and-control regulations, in
some cases, have been more effective than effluent taxes or prices in conserving resources and
reducing pollution. Greene, for example, found that federal Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) standards are "twice as important an influence as gasoline prices" in creating incentives
[*892] for automakers to develop more fuel efficient cars. n16 Most importantly, and contrary to
the prevailing view, n17 the existing "empirical" studies do not demonstrate either that commandand-control regulations are inherently inefficient or that they are invariably less efficient than
market-based alternatives.
III. An Alternative Approach to Modeling the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory
Regimes
The prevailing view of alternative regulatory regimes is oversimplified in at least three ways: (1)
it overemphasizes the differences between command-and-control regulations and "economic"
instruments for environmental protection; (2) it conflates nominal and relative economic
efficiency in comparing alternative regulatory regimes; and (3) it tends to be ahistorical and
acontextual, ignoring changes over time in marginal costs, technological capabilities, and
regulatory institutions.
As Davies and Mazurek have noted, the distinction between command-and-control regulations
and economic instruments, such as marketable emissions permits, is "not as stark as it appears...
Most of the market approaches that have been used in the United States operate within the
standard command-and-control framework." n18 For example, the sulfur dioxide trading regime
under the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments is simply an administrative command without
attendant controls (i.e., an emissions quota without a specified means for meeting the quota).
There are some incentive programs that are not tied to regulatory regimes, such as gasoline taxes,
but as Davies and Mazurek note, such pure market-based regimes are "difficult to formulate and
often are stoutly resisted by the entities to which they would apply." n19 In other words, the costs
of instituting pure market-based incentives for [*893] pollution control (without any elements
of administrative commands or controls) can be prohibitively high, despite their theoretical
efficiency advantages.
In addition, the standard account of market-based environmental protection versus commandand-control conflates nominal and relative efficiency. The nominal efficiency of a regulatory
regime is determined by comparing its social costs and benefits; the regime is nominally efficient
if it produces benefits in excess of its costs. And it remains nominally efficient even if it turns
out to be less efficient than (or relatively inefficient compared to) some real or imagined
alternative regulatory regime. Thus, a regulatory regime can be at once nominally efficient and
relatively inefficient. n20 This may seem a trivial point but, as shall become apparent, the
conflation of nominal and relative efficiency has often misled scholars, policy analysts, and
politicians into condemning all command-and-control regulations as uneconomic and
counterproductive, though some command-and-control regulations have clearly produced
substantial net social benefits.
4

The prevailing view of comparative efficiency also tends to be ahistorical and acontextual,
treating market-based approaches as if they were always more efficient, and therefore more
appropriate, than command-and-control regulations. n21 But this is not the case. This Article will
demonstrate that institutional settings exist in which command-and-control regulations tend to be
more efficient (and sometimes more effective) than market-based regulations. Thus, the relative
efficiency (and efficacy) of alternative regulatory regimes cannot be determined in isolation from
the institutional context in which they operate. n22
[*894] Moreover, the comparative efficiencies of alternative regulatory regimes change over
time, as the demand for pollution control grows and the marginal costs of pollution control
change. n23 A regulatory regime that is nominally efficient in the early days of pollution-control
efforts, when increments of environmental quality are relatively cheap, may (but will not
necessarily) grow less efficient over time - producing less return on each dollar invested - as
increments of environmental quality grow increasingly expensive. n24 However, as marginal
costs rise under one regulatory regime, they may spur the development of alternative, less costly
regulatory policies as well as new technologies that make further increments of environmental
quality efficiently attainable. Such innovations may not be adopted wholesale or implemented
overnight because of the high transaction costs commonly associated with institutional,
technological, and policy changes. n25 But at some point the benefits of a regime change may
come to outweigh the transaction costs. If and when they do, regulatory policy will tend to
evolve, if only incrementally and rarely uniformly, n26 in the direction of increased efficiency,
making affordable additional increments of environmental quality that were unaffordable under
the preceding, and now relatively less efficient, regulatory regime.
This Section has just sketched a dynamic model of environmental protection that takes seriously
both institutional and historical contexts. Part IV will elaborate this model through a series of
five hypothetical cases, designed to illustrate how institutional and technological variables can
determine the comparative efficiency of alternative regulatory regimes. A regulatory regime that
is more efficient in one institutional and technological setting may be less efficient (or
inefficient) in another. Finally, Part V supports the model with an empirical study of the history
of federal air pollution control law in the United States.
[*895]
IV. Taking Institutional and Technological Context Seriously: Hypothetical Case Studies in the
Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes
When economists, legal scholars, and policy analysts compare alternative regulatory regimes,
they typically present a dichotomy: presumptively inefficient command-and-control regulations
versus presumptively more efficient "economic" instruments, such as marketable permits. This
dichotomy is accurate often enough; in many circumstances market or quasi-market mechanisms
operate more efficiently than command-and-control regulations. But the dichotomy is not wholly
and invariably accurate. There are institutional settings in which markets are not only less
efficient than command-and-control regulations but are in fact completely ineffective in reducing
pollution. In the real world, the relative efficiency with which a particular regulatory regime
maximizes a social welfare function depends on institutional and technological circumstances.
5

As Weitzman has noted, "there may be important practical reasons for favouring [one among
alternative] planning instruments. These reasons might involve ideological, political, legal,
social, historical, administrative, motivational, informational, monitoring, enforcing, or other
considerations." n27
To illustrate the role of technological and institutional factors, the following subsections examine
five hypothetical "cases" in which the efficiency of a pollution-permit trading regime is
compared with that of a command-and-control regime. It is worth noting that these two regimes
are not so distinct as some scholars have suggested. In both instances, an authority sets a quota
that is backed by statutory sanctions. The only real distinction is in the means chosen for meeting
the quota. With command-and-control, the authorities specify the means (usually technological)
for attaining the emission-reduction goal; with emissions trading, by contrast, the authorities
allow the market (comprised of regulated industries) to determine how to achieve the emissionreduction goal. In a real sense, a pollution permit trading regime is a system of commandwithout-control.
A. Case 1 (The Ideal Case): Perfect Property Rights, Perfect Information, and Perfect Markets
To begin, consider the idealized setting of an efficiently operating market economy (with
attendant institutions) in which property rights are perfectly specified. All environmental goods
(including, for example, the [*896] atmosphere) have been parcelized and allotted to individual
owners who possess and can enforce through the legal system typical property rights to use,
exclude, and trade. In this ideal world benefit and cost functions are fully known; a social
welfare function is completely specified; the authorities always maximize the net dollar value of
social welfare; information costs for all people in society are low, so that the level of pollution
and the distribution of costs and benefits are both always known; and bargaining (and other
transactions) are essentially costless. This is the world of the Coase theorem, and in it social
costs and benefits equal private costs and benefits. n28
The level of pollution abatement in this ideal world is the point at which marginal benefits (MB)
equal marginal costs (MC), as shown in Figure 1. Optimal levels of abatement will be y* at a
marginal cost p*. Because the optimal level of pollution control is automatically attained by
virtue of the assumptions of perfect markets, perfect information, and perfect specification of
property rights, government intervention to protect the environment cannot enhance efficiency.
With property rights completely specified, there should be no significant and uncompensated-for
(i.e., no inefficient) externalities, n29 and hence no market failures requiring correction. n30 Any
government-mandated pollution reductions would produce more costs than benefits for society.
Needless to say, this ideal world does not exist. In the real world, property rights are always
imperfectly specified; social welfare functions, which presumably underlie government action,
are imperfectly delineated; information is incomplete and asymmetrical; and transaction costs of
various kinds are always positive and may be quite high. n31 Thus, the market does not
automatically achieve the optimal level of pollution control. And government intervention for
environmental protection may, but does not necessarily, enhance efficiency. n32
[*897]
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Figure 1: This figure presents the standard depiction of efficiency in pollution abatement. At
y*p* the optimal level of abatement is achieved by definition.
[SEE FIGURE IN ORIGINAL]
B. Common Assumptions of Cases 2-5
Real-world environmental problems and regulatory solutions require substantial deviation from
the assumptions of the ideal case. Changing the assumptions leads to different assessments of the
comparative efficiency of alternative regulatory regimes. The four cases that follow are designed
to illustrate that a single regulatory approach may be relatively efficient in some institutional and
technological contexts but relatively (and even nominally) inefficient in others.
Each of the four cases relies on the following five assumptions:

(1) the political-economic system is one of incomplete property rights and imperfect information;
(2) complete benefit and cost functions are not known (and cannot be known) ex ante;
(3) the government endeavors to institute efficient regulation, and so sets exogenously a level of
pollution abatement (<cir y>), which is expected to improve social welfare;
[*898] (4) the government assumes that each increment of abatement (y) provides some social
benefit; and
(5) all polluters are not identical in their costs of control.

The government faces a benefit function in which benefits (B) increase in the quantity of
abatement; that is, all abatement adds some positive benefits. The level of benefits, however, is
subject to uncertainty because an exact measure of benefits can only be imperfectly estimated
before any regulatory regime is implemented. n33 Put another way, the government explicitly or
implicitly estimates a range of possible levels of benefits from any given quantity of abatement,
but expected benefits will vary around a mean value to a greater or lesser extent depending on
the degree of uncertainty. n34 For example, benefits typically include the discounted value of
long-run health benefits, but this value must be sensitive to estimates not only of discount rates
and projected health care costs but also to an estimate of the health care costs that would have
been incurred in the absence of abatement, since this would be a cost foregone through
abatement and must be considered a component of net benefits. It is assumed, then, that the
function can be approximated within a range, although this range may be quite large depending
on the information available to the authorities. If returns are increasing, marginal benefits may
likewise be increasing over a certain range, but it is assumed that at a given quantity of
abatement marginal benefits are positive but falling in y. n35
7

Costs are defined by a similar function. Cost (C) will depend on the amount of abatement (y) and
the level of uncertainty about future costs. However, costs are also assumed to be a function of
institutional variables - notably the cost of administration, compliance monitoring, and
enforcement of any regime given a particular political-economic system and technological
capability. Institutional variables may have one or two effects on the cost function. First, they
may act as a shift parameter; that is, given known costs of abatement technology and the
institutional capability to implement and enforce a particular regime, the cost range will shift up
or down. In addition, institutional variables may either decrease or increase uncertainty. Put
another way, institutional factors will be functionally related to both overall costs and
uncertainty. [*899] Thus, where a regime requires contract enforcement, but enforcement
institutions are weak and operate inconsistently, there may be greater uncertainty and greater
expected variance concerning the ultimate cost of achieving the desired level of abatement.
The marginal cost curve, though highly dependent on uncertainty and institutional factors, will
nonetheless be assumed to be rising in y. n36 In a world of perfect information and perfect
markets, the marginal cost curve would be unaffected by institutional costs. However, here it is
assumed more realistically that institutions do entail costs. Indeed, in some cases institutional
costs approach infinity.
Institutional variables are included here to imply that in many cases, regulators may select a
regulatory regime that is "second best" from the standpoint of theory but more efficient in the
institutional and technological context. Meanwhile, the alternative that is "first best" in theory
may not be feasible in the institutional and technological context at finite cost, or at a cost lower
than the "second best" alternative. In other words, the "second best" regime may be the "first
best" solution, given practical considerations or local conditions.
The authorities presumably seek to attain the optimal level of abatement. To do so, they select a
quota level of abatement (<cir y>). Since the benefit and cost functions are uncertain and may
reflect the institutional setting as well as uncertain information, regulators face the problem
illustrated in Figure 2. The marginal benefit is estimated to fall between MB1 and MB2;
marginal costs between MC1 and MC2.
Consider a scenario in which the authorities decide to use an estimate of benefits at the mean of
the range. At the same time, rather than choose the mean of the cost range, they choose the
highest extreme of marginal costs for ex ante calculation (perhaps in order to minimize the
political costs of instituting a mistaken policy). An equilibrium price and quantity will thus be
reached at point D. However, if marginal benefits are higher (say, on MB1), <cir y> will have
been set too low, and the area DBA will represent a deadweight loss. Similarly, if the benefits
schedule is closer to MB2, <cir y> will clearly have been set too high and some social loss (the
area DFC) will result. The greatest social loss occurs if benefits are at the highest and costs at the
lowest of their respective ranges (at G). Here the area BHG represents a social loss. In any case,
if these curves are imagined as an infinite set of possible results given various regulatory regimes
as well as various states of the world, ex ante it is unlikely that the level of abatement chosen by
the authority would prove to be optimal, and some ex post inefficiency would result.
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Upon setting <cir y>, government authorities select from among regulatory regimes i-1, 2, 3, ... j,
which are defined by a set of cost functions C[in'i-j'].
[*900]
Figure 2: Each point—B, D, H, or C—represents levels of marginal costs and benefits that may
be achieved with positive probability at abatement quantity <cir y>. They may represent efficient
levels if marginal benefits equal marginal costs at those points. However, if MC2-MB2 obtains,
then attaining <cir y> will mean that there is some social loss (represented by the area ECH).
Other shaded areas represent social welfare losses, depending again on various combinations of
marginal costs and benefits.

[SEE FIGURE IN ORIGINAL]
Any of these regimes may achieve <cir y> (although not necessarily at finite cost), but regulators
pick the regime with the lowest expected total cost and greatest predicted efficiency. As between
any two regimes, however, one may be relatively more efficient in a particular institutional and
technological context than the other.
Figure 3 illustrates this. In this figure, marginal benefits are assumed to be independent of the
regime that is chosen. Marginal costs are estimated to fall either in the range MC1-MC2 or
mc1<prime>-mc2<prime>. For example, the MC1-MC2 range may be expected marginal cost of
a market-based regime; the mc1<prime>-mc2<prime> the expected marginal cost of a
command-and-control regime. In this case, the command-and-control regime has a marginal cost
with a lower mean and smaller variance.
Consequently, it would be expected to be the less costly regime. It is important to note that
regulators' expectations could turn out to be mistaken. Consider the case where ex post costs of
the market-based regime are closer to MC2 and the command-and-control costs closer to
mc1<prime>. In that case, the market-based approach would be more efficient. But that case is
relatively unlikely to occur. Given its greater expected ex ante certainty and probable efficiency
gains, command-and-control is likely to be the more efficient choice. It is important to recognize
that whichever equilibrium (in Figure 3) is realized ex post, enacting the
[*901]
Figure 3: The ranges MC1-MC2 and mc1<prime>-mc2<prime> represent, respectively, the costs
of an economic instrument (an effluent tax or tradable-permit program) and a technology-based
command-and-control program at a given point in time. Both entail considerable ex ante
uncertainty, but the command-and-control program (mc1<prime>-mc2<prime>) has a lower
expected cost on average and therefore the largest expected net benefits, given the benefit range
MB1-MB2.
[SEE FIGURE IN ORIGINAL]
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regulatory program in the first place is efficiency-enhancing. Choosing <cir y> and actually
achieving it, even in the worst cases depicted in Figures 2 and 3, is Kaldor-Hicks superior to a
world in which no regulation takes place; that is, the regulatory regime yields net social benefits
in moving from the status quo ante. n37
It is possible, of course, to imagine a case, depicted in Figure 4, in which this would not be true.
Figure 4 represents the exact same problem as Figure 2, but the marginal cost range, for
institutional reasons, is shifted slightly upward and to the left, and the overall range is expanded
because of greater variance. If in fact MC1 occurs, the cost curve will be so steep that to reach
<cir y> total costs must exceed total benefits. (Net costs, represented by the area CFH, exceed
net benefits, represented by the area IJC.) Point D, though representing something of a mean
value for both benefits and costs, is not attainable if costs exceed the mean. Indeed, a cautious
authority, unsure of reaching a level of y beyond C where benefits exceed costs, might choose
instead to implement a lower <cir y>. Alternatively, the authority might choose a different
regulatory regime that offers a greater level of certainty in attaining <cir y>, even if that
alternative regime is in theory (and in the absence of uncertainty) less efficient. In other words,
the range of uncertainty of the costs of attaining <cir y> can skew the relative efficiency of
alternative regulatory regimes.
[*902]
Figure 4: This figure shows how total costs may exceed total benefits. If marginal costs are MCI
and marginal benefits are MB2, then the total costs will be greater than the total benefits at <cir
y>. Total costs and benefits would be represented by the area under each curve. In this case, total
costs are the area under JF; total benefits are the area under IH. The net total loss is represented
by the area of the triangle CFH, minus the area of the triangle IJC. Note that in this scenario, the
efficient level is at C.
[SEE FIGURE IN ORIGINAL]
For the sake of both simplicity and realism, institutional variables and constraints are assumed to
be independent; that is, these cases do not assume that enforcement costs will be high just
because monitoring costs are high. It is, of course, possible in the real world for enforcement
costs to be high because monitoring costs are high, but it is not invariably the case.
These cases also assume (again, for the sake of simplicity) that there are only two alternative
regimes for pollution control. In the first (Regime 1), the government imposes command-andcontrol pollution abatement, e.g., the mandatory installation of abatement technology by all
regulated polluters regardless of their differential compliance costs. In the second (Regime 2),
the government issues a limited number of pollution allowances, which regulated polluters can
freely trade to minimize compliance costs.
Most analysts assume, all other things being equal, that the total costs of pollution control will be
lower under Regime 2; by directing the bulk of the pollution-reduction burden to low-cost
abaters, a marketable permit system should provide (at least) as much pollution control as
Regime 1 at lower cost. In reality, however, this outcome will occur only under certain
10

conditions; specifically, when the regulatory regime as a [*903] whole is more efficient. For
example, permit trading requires a more elaborate (hence, more costly) technological and
institutional structure for monitoring compliance than do technology-based command-andcontrol regulations. n38 This can affect the overall efficiency of Regime 2, even to the point of
reversing its theoretical economic superiority over Regime 1. In addition, depending on the
institutional and technological context, one regime may be far more costly to establish than
another, shifting total cost curves. This may be especially true for tradable permit schemes where
market institutions are weak because, for example, budget constraints are soft. But again, for
simplicity's sake, these cases assume that fixed costs for both regimes are identical.
Cases 2 though 5 will now compare the hypothetical performance of the two regimes to illustrate
how the relative (and sometimes nominal) efficiency of each depends in large measure on the
institutional and technological context.
C. Case 2: High Abatement Costs; Low Monitoring and Enforcement Costs
High abatement costs would lead the government to prefer Regime 2 over Regime 1 because the
bulk of abatement under Regime 2 will come from relatively low-cost abaters, whereas under
Regime 1, all regulated entities must reduce emissions by the same amount, regardless of their
differential costs of abatement. Meanwhile, because monitoring and enforcement costs are low in
this setting, they will have less impact on the overall cost structure, providing no reason to prefer
one regime over the other. Consequently, the total costs of Regime 2 are likely to be lower than
the total costs of Regime 1 in this case. This is not to say that Regime 1 is inefficient - that would
depend on whether it is economically superior to no regulation at all - but Regime 1 is almost
certain to be less efficient than Regime 2.
This case reflects the conventional wisdom that marketable permit systems are more efficient
than command-and-control regulations because they are less costly. But this depends on the
assumption that monitoring and enforcement costs are not significantly higher for one regime
than for another. In the real world, this assumption does not always hold, and Case 3 illustrates
how the estimates of relative efficiency change when it does not.
[*904]
D. Case 3: Low Abatement Costs; High Monitoring Costs
In the case of low abatement costs and high monitoring costs, increments of environmental
quality are relatively inexpensive; that is, under either Regime 1 or Regime 2, the technology
exists that will provide additional units of pollution abatement at low marginal cost. At the same
time, emission monitoring capabilities are deficient; the authorities can measure ambient
concentrations of pollutants, but perhaps no low-cost technology exists to permit the precise
measurement of emissions at individual sources. If the government selects a regulatory regime
that requires precise measurement of emissions at individual sources, monitoring costs will be
higher and ex ante uncertainty about ultimate costs will be higher; the marginal cost range will
shift upward; and the expected variance will be greater.
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In this case, Regime 1 may entail lower total costs than Regime 2. If the government simply
orders all potential polluters to install available pollution-reduction technology (such as
scrubbers), it can be confident of achieving some amount of emissions reduction, even if it
cannot precisely measure how much. The installation and operation of the technology itself
constitutes the attainment of the desired level of abatement (<cir y>). n39
By contrast, under the technological constraints assumed in this case, Regime 2 may not provide
an effective or efficient solution. Consider a case in which the government wishes to reduce
emissions by fifty percent. To accomplish this under Regime 2, the authorities must (1)
determine current emissions levels, (2) divide that amount in half, and (3) allocate the remainder
among the regulated polluters. Subsequently, the authorities would have to (4) continuously
monitor their emissions to ensure that they did not exceed their quotas. But lacking the ability to
monitor emissions at individual sources, the government would be unable to complete steps (1)
or (4), which would prevent a transferable pollution "rights" program from ever getting off the
ground. Polluters would have scarce incentive to either abate emissions or trade allowances if
their emissions levels could not be measured. n40
In this instance, it seems clear that a command-and-control approach, because it does not depend
on individual point-source [*905] monitoring, would be relatively effective and efficient
compared to a transferable pollution "rights" program. This does not mean that Regime 1 would
be optimally efficient or very effective, but under the circumstances Regime 1 - the "second
best" - would be a better alternative. n41 This hypothetical case fairly represents the
circumstances that confronted Congress in 1970, when it enacted the Clean Air Act, which is
examined in Part V. This case also reflects continuing circumstances in many countries with
primitive monitoring and enforcement technology. Fraschini and Cassone, for example, suggest
that the "quite backward" state of emissions monitoring and enforcement technology in Italy
"explains why economic instruments ... are virtually absent" from Italian water pollution control
policy. n42
This case and the previous one are both static. While a government regulator will need to use
cost estimates based on what is known at the time the regulatory regime is selected and
implemented, cost curves will likely change over time. Both technological and administrative
costs may shift as a result of changes in productivity or factor prices. Of course, such changes
may shift the curves up or down, and may increase or decrease the variance. However, progress
along learning curves as well as technological change will more than likely shift and narrow the
marginal cost curves, as shown in Figure 5 (in shifting from time t to time t+1). If this shift in the
range of marginal costs represents a fall in monitoring costs (thanks to technological or
institutional innovations), Case 3 could evolve into Case 2. n43 That is, it might become costeffective and Kaldor-Hicks improving to change from a regulatory regime that minimizes
monitoring costs (Regime 1) to one that minimizes abatement costs (Regime 2).
It is also likely that the range of benefits will narrow as more information on actual benefits is
gathered over time; the superior information can then be more reliably extrapolated. Total
benefits may also grow as population rises or as evidence reveals unanticipated gains. Moreover,
as these benefits and costs become less uncertain, regulators can approach the Kaldor-Hicks
optimal outcome (y*) by raising or lowering abatement quotas.
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[*906]
Figure 5: As monitoring technology improves and costs become more certain over time (from
time t to t+1), the range of marginal costs becomes both narrower and lower, making additional
abatement efficiently attainable.
[SEE FIGURE IN ORIGINAL]
E. Case 4: A Non-Market Economy with Endemic Soft Budget Constraints but Hard Law
Constraints
The last two cases assumed an important institutional characteristic: that the regulatory regime
was operating within an efficient market-based economic system. But in many parts of the world,
even after the fall of communism in Europe, economic activity is either not market-oriented at all
or occurs within inefficient markets.
The present case assumes a non-market (that is, an administered or command) economic system,
in which the State is the dominant player, owning or controlling a large share of the means of
production. This case further assumes, following Kornai, that state enterprises in this command
economy operate under soft budget constraints, so that their survival is determined not by profits
and losses in the market but by political criteria - quantity of output, most commonly - as set by
central-government administrators. n44 So long as enterprises meet or exceed planned production
targets, they will be maximally rewarded with increased budget allocations from the central
government. However, this case assumes that these state enterprises still face hard law
constraints; that is, the state can and will enforce regulatory requirements against them. n45
[*907] In this case, Regime 2 cannot possibly work. First, there might not be any market within
which transferable pollution "rights" would meaningfully be priced. n46 The MC range would be
shifted drastically upward to the left (as illustrated in Figure 6). Moreover, regardless of the price
of pollution "rights," state-owned enterprises operating under soft budget constraints are unlikely
to participate in pollution "rights" trading because participation would be unlikely to enhance
their profitability. Again, their economic survival does not depend on profits or losses but on
their ability to maximize output, regardless of efficiency. Enterprises operating under these rules
are unlikely to engage in activities such as pollution control that might reduce total output, even
if doing so would enhance efficiency. Meanwhile, any financial penalties enterprises might incur
for not reducing pollution (assuming the government can monitor compliance at reasonable cost)
would have little impact on profitability because of the endemic soft budget constraints. So long
as enterprises meet their annual plan production targets, they will be compensated for any
environmental penalties with increased budget expenditures.
The nature of the incentive structure in the command economy is such that polluters have every
reason not to expend resources on pollution control when doing so might jeopardize their
abilities to meet state-mandated production goals. As Figure 6 shows, for a transferable pollution
"rights" program, given the shift in costs, the equilibrium level of y is far below <cir y>, which
could not in fact be achieved at any finite cost. In sum, market-based approaches to pollution
control cannot be effective in either a non-market economy or a market economy characterized
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by soft budget constraints (which will probably obtain in some mixed economies with dominant
state-owned industries). n47 And because a pollution "rights" trading regime cannot possibly
achieve the desired result of maximizing social welfare where B > C, such a regime is not only
less efficient compared with command-and-control but nominally inefficient.
In this case, Regime 1 becomes the only feasible alternative. Because law constraints are hard,
the government will enforce its command-and-control regulations against polluters who would
otherwise costlessly ignore fees, fines, or other "market-based" incentives to reduce pollution
under Regime 2. Although a technology-based command-and[*908]
Figure 6: In this case, though <cir y> is mandated by regulators it cannot be attained at finite
cost. Technological and/or institutional change is required to reach that level. More realistic
regulators should set <cir y> between points EB and ED.
[SEE FIGURE IN ORIGINAL]
control regulation may be less efficient than some unrealizable ideal, it is clearly more efficient
than any alternative market-based solution given the institutional constraints of this case. Indeed,
this case presents in sharp relief the problem of institutional context: A certain regulatory regime
that is effective and efficient in one institutional setting may not be effective or efficient in
another.
F. Case 5: A Non-Market Economy with Endemic Soft Budget Constraints and Soft Law
Constraints
This final case is based on the same assumptions as Case 4 with one vitally important change: In
addition to soft budget constraints, the command economy is characterized by soft law
constraints, which means that the government is unlikely to enforce its regulations against state
enterprises. This case represents the actual state of affairs before the fall of communism in many
Soviet bloc countries. For example, in People's Poland, as Cole has shown, environmental laws
were fairly sophisticated and standards were strict (in some cases, stricter than comparable
American standards). n48 Moreover, Poland's environmental protection regime relied heavily on
market mechanisms; specifically, per-unit emission fees and fines. However, under socialism,
Poland's environmental protection regime failed because law and budget constraints were both
soft; legal regulations were only rarely enforced against state enterprises, which also had no
market incentives to conserve [*909] resources or minimize pollution, since they were
insensitive to the price signals of environmental fees and fines.
When budget and law constraints are both soft, environmental regulations are ineffective no
matter which regulatory approach is selected. Even if all uncertainty is eliminated, <cir y>
cannot be attained. Neither Regime 1 nor Regime 2 can be effective or efficient. In this case,
institutional and/or technological change becomes a necessary prerequisite for effective
environmental protection.
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G. Limitations of the Analysis
The various cases in this Section only approximate real-world situations. Moreover, many other
possible cases (and variations on cases) that might affect the comparative efficiency analysis
have been excluded. This Section has focused on just a few variables that seem to be of great
importance in just a few simplified cases, and not all possible relations between them are
included here. Nevertheless, the five cases explored in this Section should be sufficient to
demonstrate the importance of context for determining the comparative efficiency of alternative
environmental protection regimes. A regulatory approach that is both nominally and relatively
efficient in one setting may be relatively and even nominally inefficient in another. In order to
understand properly regulatory regimes and the ways they evolve over time, attention must be
paid to the institutional and technological contexts that can greatly influence cost structures and
incentives.
V. A Historical Study in the Efficient Evolution of Regulatory Policy: Federal Air Pollution
Control in the U.S., 1970-1990
This Section concerns not a stylized case but a real, evolving case: federal air pollution control
under the Clean Air Act, 1970-1990. The analysis suggests that, given existing institutional
constraints and technological capabilities, both the early reliance on command-and-control
regulations and subsequent incremental experimentation with market-based solutions such as
transferable pollution "rights" programs have generally been efficient. The discussion begins, for
the sake of comparison, with a brief review of the "conventional" story of the Clean Air Act's
regulatory regime.
[*910]
A. The Conventional Economic History of the Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act has been described as "one of the more complicated statutes yet produced by
a modern industrial state." n49 The Clean Air Act is characterized by "heavy reliance on
administrative expertise and the use of uniform, categorical rules as basic regulatory building
blocks" - in other words, command-and-control. n50 "Congress told industry what it could and
could not belch from its smokestacks, how clean it would need to make new cars, and the type of
pollution control devices it would have to install." n51 These command-and-control regulations
were viewed as "blunt" and "often wildly inefficient and ... "irrational'" instruments for achieving
environmental goals. n52
The main goal of the Clean Air Act of 1970 (and still its main goal today) was the attainment,
100% of the time, of national ambient air quality standards, which are a set of maximum
permissible atmospheric concentrations of pollutants over various time periods. Congress
ordered the newly created Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to establish National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQSs) for pervasive air pollutants, such as carbon
monoxide, sulfur dioxide, and dust (particulate matter), building in an "adequate margin of
safety" to protect the health of even the most sensitive human populations without regard to cost.
n53
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In order to attain the economically oblivious NAAQSs, Congress relied on a number of even
more dubious (according to the standard neoclassical perspective) tools. First, legislators ordered
the EPA to set technology-based emission standards without regard to differential costs of
compliance across or within industries. All firms within a given regulated industry or category of
industries had to achieve the same pollution-control goal, no matter that it cost one firm $ 100
million to do so but another only $ 10 million. n54 Moreover, Congress placed the heaviest
emission-reduction burdens on new sources through the imposition of New Source Performance
Standards (NSPSs), which created perverse incentives. While Congress was correct to presume
that new factories could build in emissions-reduction technologies more cheaply than older
factories could retrofit them, the Clean Air Act's more [*911] stringent NSPSs induced firms to
extend the life spans of older, dirtier factories to avoid building newer, cleaner, and (because of
NSPSs) more expensive plants. n55 The technology-based NSPSs also created disincentives for
regulated industries to innovate new pollution control technologies that might become the basis
for revised NSPSs. n56
The Clean Air Act's NSPSs were also subject to political manipulation (as Public Choice theory
n57
would lead one to expect), which compounded their inefficiency. The most famous example
may have been Congress's vacillation on performance standards for new coal-fired power plants.
In the 1970 Clean Air Act, Congress required the EPA to set emissions standards for new
sources based on the best available technology that was adequately demonstrated. n58 The EPA
interpreted this mandate broadly: Congress did not intend the Agency to require specific
factories to install specific technologies; rather, the Agency was to set emission standards based
on available technologies and possible process changes and materials substitution. On this
interpretation, the Agency did not have to set standards that would force all new power plants to
install scrubbers on smokestacks; instead, some plants might meet emissions standards simply by
substituting less polluting but more expensive low-sulfur coal for more polluting but less
expensive high-sulfur coal. Economists certainly approved of this more flexible and, therefore,
presumably less costly approach to standard-setting. But it [*912] generated an intense political
controversy that pitted low-sulfur coal producers, located predominantly in the West, against
high-sulfur coal producers, located primarily in the East. Eastern coal interests won a temporary
victory in 1977 as Congress amended the Clean Air Act to, in effect, mandate the use of
scrubbers at all power plants, regardless of the type of coal they burned. n59 As long as they had
to scrub emissions anyway, many utilities that had been burning less polluting, low-sulfur
(western) coal switched to more polluting but less expensive high-sulfur (eastern) coal. The
ironic result may have been a net increase in national sulfur emissions. Meanwhile, the cost of
pollution control for the utility industry went up because end-of-the-pipe solutions like scrubbers
tend to be more expensive than process changes and materials substitution. n60
Besides exacerbating the inherent inefficiencies of the pre-existing NSPS program, the 1977
Amendments also added a new program that economists widely condemned. In 1972, a federal
district court ruled that the Clean Air Act required the EPA to prevent deterioration of air quality
in regions that had already attained the NAAQS. n61 Pursuant to this court order, the Agency
promulgated Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) regulations that Congress later
codified in its 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments. Apparently, Congress agreed that air quality in
pristine regions should not be permitted to deteriorate to the level of the NAAQSs (which, after
all, were merely intended as floors of minimally acceptable air quality). But assuming the
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NAAQSs were properly set, they already were protecting the health of the most sensitive
segments of the population of clean-air regions "with an adequate margin of safety." What
legitimate basis was there, then, for curtailing economic [*913] development out of concern
over marginal, non-hazardous increases in air pollution?
Public Choice theory offered an alternative explanation for the adoption of the PSD program.
According to Pashigian,

PSD policy was developed to attenuate the locational competition between developed and less
developed regions and between urban and rural areas. The votes cast in the House on PSD policy
[in the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments] ... show opposition to PSD policy comes from the
South, the West, and rural locations, areas with higher growth rates and with general superior air
quality. PSD policy is opposed in these areas because it places limits on growth. The strongest
supporters of PSD policy are northern urban areas, many of whom have lower air quality and are
not directly affected by PSD policy. n62

Pashigian's analysis neglects the fact that Congress did not originate the PSD program but
merely codified with relatively minor changes an existing program, which the EPA promulgated
under court order. n63 But this analysis nevertheless explains why Congress did not hesitate to
codify the EPA's PSD program in its 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments. By the mid-1970s, many
dirty-air regions were under pressure to reduce emissions, to attain the NAAQS, which
constrained their own economic development. Nonattainment areas were rationally fearful of a
potential large-scale shift in economic development to pristine-air regions. From the perspective
of nonattainment areas, the PSD rules merely leveled the economic playing field. Of course,
clean-air regions viewed the situation differently; they saw it as a re-tilting of the field back in
favor of the already heavily developed areas of the North and East. From their perspective, why
should clear-air regions of the West and South be prevented from developing economically
merely because of the development mistakes of the North and East? n64
These are just some of the components of the Clean Air Act that, according to some economists
and policy analysts, n65 have imposed great costs on society. Hahn, for example, calculates that
command-and-control air pollution regulations have cost Americans $ 30 billion per [*914]
year, as an "invisible tax on users of commodities that are produced by industry." n66 And what
has been attained for that price? Orts notes that "command-and-control often fails to achieve the
environmental results hoped for." n67 Indeed, many regions of the country still fail to meet the
NAAQSs for one or more "criteria" pollutants. And the Clean Air Act's program for controlling
"hazardous" (e.g., cancer-causing) air pollutants, at least until 1990, has been almost completely
ineffective.
The net social benefits of the nation's air pollution control efforts would have been far higher,
critics claim, if, from the beginning, the federal government had adopted less costly and more
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flexible approaches to regulation than command-and-control. According to some estimates, leastcost approaches would have reduced by a factor of four the total cost of air pollution control. n68
B. An Alternative History: The Clean Air Act's Efficient Evolution
There is much that is true in the conventional story of federal air pollution control. But it cannot
be the whole story, because despite all of its alleged inefficiencies, the Clean Air Act has
managed to produce sizeable net benefits to society throughout its history. n69 The conventional
story is, in fact, substantially misleading because it leaves out many important institutional and
technological facts that have affected the relative efficiency of real-world policy choices.
Doubtless air pollution goals could have been accomplished at less cost. But the Clean Air Act
has been generally efficient, whether in spite or because of its heavy reliance on command-andcontrol regulations. The conventional history of federal air pollution control efforts ignores three
important variables, any one of which can determine the efficacy and efficiency of pollution
control efforts: (1) institutional knowledge and learning; (2) technological constraints and
innovations; and (3) the changing costs and benefits of pollution control over time. Once these
factors are introduced into the analysis, it becomes apparent that federal air pollution control
efforts, including the early heavy reliance on command-and-control, have generally been
nominally, if not optimally, efficient.
At the outset, it is important to recognize that Congress did not enact the 1970 Clean Air Act sui
generis. Although it "marked a major change [*915] [from earlier federal air pollution
legislation] in priorities, emphasis, and approach," n70 the 1970 Clean Air Act was founded on
regulatory institutions established in earlier enactments, including the 1963 Clean Air Act, the
1965 Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act, and the 1967 Air Quality Act. It is not
insignificant that Congress itself labeled the 1970 law "Amendments." Consistent with the theory
of "path dependence" - according to which institutional change tends to be incremental and based
on pre-existing models, rather than large-scale and path-breaking n71 - sever al of the foundations
of the 1970 law came from those earlier enactments: Air Quality Control Regions as the
jurisdictions of regulation; Ambient Air Quality Standards as the primary targets of air pollution
control (though the 1970 Act switched the locus of standard-setting from the states to the federal
government); and reliance on health-based and technology-based command-and-control
solutions. n72
A review of the 1970 Clean Air Act's legislative history confirms that Congress intended to
improve and build upon pre-existing models, rather than elaborate an entirely novel approach to
regulation. Congress was primarily concerned with the need to improve air quality rapidly and
with deficiencies in existing monitoring capabilities; Congress did not even consider effluent
taxes or tradable emissions permits, although economists and environmental policy analysts were
already advocating their use. n73 In more than 1500 pages of legislative history accompanying the
Act, there is but a single reference to effluent taxes as a potential complement to or substitute for
emissions standards. During a May 27, 1970 hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on Air and
Water Pollution of the Committee of Public Works, Dr. John T. Middleton, Commissioner of the
National Air Pollution Control Administration (NAPCA), was asked about the feasibility of
effluent taxes for pollution control. He answered that his Agency was looking into the question,
and that was the end of it. n74 This lack of attention to economic instruments for air pollution
18

[*916] control may suggest (on a Public Choice view) that Congress and the interest groups
pressing for federal air pollution control simply had no interest in efficiency-enhancing economic
instruments. Alternatively, it may suggest that in the 1970s the transaction costs of shifting
regulatory regimes may have been too high relative to the benefits to be gained. n75
When Congress enacted the 1970 Clean Air Act, it was operating under severe information
constraints. Precious little information was available about the economic costs of pollution and
the economic benefits of pollution control. (Any estimates were exceptionally rough and subject
to great uncertainties.) Later studies have attempted, with the aid of hindsight, to calculate the
costs and benefits of the Clean Air Act. Portney assessed and compared various studies to
estimate the total costs and benefits of federal air pollution control between 1970 and 1981. His
analysis suggests that the benefits of air pollution control during that period exceeded costs by
more than $ 26.3 billion. Portney cautioned, however, that the costs of additional increments of
air pollution control should have risen sharply since 1981, "much faster than benefits could have
been expected to increase." n76
Portney's prediction reflects a belief that marginal benefits fall as the quantity of pollution
control increases, while the marginal cost curve rises steeply. The same supposition is reflected
in Figures 1-6 of this Article, all of which display downward sloping marginal benefit curves and
upward sloping marginal cost curves. But in fact the actual benefits of the Clean Air Act have
not only continued to rise since 1981, they have risen at a faster rate than total costs. This
suggests either that Portney was incorrect about the shape or position of the curves post-1981, or
more likely, that he presumed that marginal cost and benefit curves were static when they were
not. In fact, both of these curves have shifted during the history of the Clean Air Act. As Portney
expected, marginal costs increased - increments of control are more costly today [*917] than
they were twenty years ago. But benefits increased even more. Apparently, the marginal benefit
curve shifted upward even more than the marginal cost curve, as additional and more highly
valued benefits accrued from reduced air pollution.
Whatever the explanation, the evidence is clear that the Clean Air Act has provided increasing
net benefits to society throughout its history. Between 1981 and 1990, annualized and inflationadjusted compliance costs rose by 17%, from $ 20.9 billion to $ 25.3 billion. n77 During this
period, emissions of all "criteria" air pollutants n78 fell and air quality improved significantly.
National emissions of criteria pollutants, excluding lead, declined by an average of 11.2%; the
average reduction jumps to 24% if lead is included because lead emissions fell by 87% between
1981 and 1989. n79 Thanks to these emissions reductions, national ambient concentrations of
criteria pollutants fell between 1981 and 1988 by an average of 22.6% (only 10.6% if lead is
excluded). n80
The EPA has priced many of the benefits of emissions and ambient concentration reductions
under the 1970 Clean Air Act. Its mean estimate of benefits (in constant 1990 dollars) grew from
$ 355 billion in 1975, to $ 930 billion in 1980, to more than $ 1.2 trillion in 1990. n81 In fact, the
increase in total benefits exceeded by a substantial margin (both nominally and in percentage
terms) the increase in the costs of complying with Clean Air Act regulations. Contrary to the
prevailing wisdom, the 1970 Clean Air Act's predominantly command-and-control regulatory
regime grew increasingly efficient between 1970 and 1990, producing far more benefits than
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costs for society. Indeed, according to the EPA, the "net, direct, monetized benefits" of the Clean
Air Act, 1970 to 1990 "ranged from 4.3 to 28.2 trillion dollars, with a central estimate of 13.7
[*918] trillion dollars." n82 Whether or not this central estimate is accurate, the important point
for present purposes is that the Clean Air Act has continued to produce some level of net social
benefits throughout its history. In a recent interview, Paul Portney asserted that any analysis of
the Act would conclude that its benefits outweigh its costs. n83 And after conducting an extensive
review of the literature, Davies and Mazurek concur: "Taken as a whole, the benefits of the
Clean Air Act seem clearly to outweigh the costs." n84
Still, according to the "conventional story" outlined earlier in this Section, the Clean Air Act
would have been more efficient (i.e., would have produced greater net benefits for society), had
it relied from inception on more flexible market-based approaches. But that story ignores
significant economic, institutional, and technological constraints that existed when Congress
enacted the 1970 Clean Air Act. To be accurate, any comparison of costs and benefits must
include an assessment of the transaction costs that such a large-scale shift in regulatory regimes
would have entailed. And there is no question that a shift from a predominantly command-andcontrol regime to a market-based system would have entailed substantial, perhaps prohibitive,
transaction costs. This is most obviously true with respect to costs of monitoring and
enforcement, which tend to be higher for market-based programs, such as emissions trading, than
for command-and-control regulations.
Monitoring, enforcement capabilities, and costs were among Congress's primary concerns when
it enacted the Clean Air Act in 1970. The legislative history is replete with reports, hearings, and
statements concerning deficiencies in air-pollution monitoring. n85 According to a report by the
NAPCA, for example, air-pollution monitoring equipment and "analytical techniques" available
in 1970 were "not adequate to meet current and anticipated future needs in air monitoring, source
testing, measurement of meteorological parameters, and laboratory research." n86 Nationwide in
1970 there were 245 particulate matter (dust) monitors, 86 sulfur dioxide monitors, 82 carbon
monoxide monitors, 43 nitrogen oxide [*919] monitors, and only 1 monitor for ozone. n87 These
monitors and other available analytical equipment "lacked accuracy, sufficient sensitivity to
reflect progress in controlling air pollution, or the specificity needed to satisfy air quality criteria
requirements." n88
Point-source emissions monitoring was in an even less satisfactory state than ambient
concentration monitoring. In the late 1960s, the government requested that industries selfmonitor (to the extent possible) and report on their emissions rates. According to the NAPCA:

In large measure, industry response to such requests [was] good, but there have been instances of
refusal to provide requested information. Often, information [was] refused on the ground that it
[did] not exist or because assembling it would [have been] an undue burden on the company.
There [were] cases, however, in which refusal seemingly reflected an unwillingness to cooperate.
n89
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This confirmed the need for independent government monitoring to ensure compliance with
pollution-control requirements.
Congress was also concerned with inadequate staffing of the state administrative agencies
charged with implementing federal and state air pollution regulations. According to a 1970 report
to Congress by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), "control agencies"
were "in general ... inadequately staffed. Fifty percent of State agencies [had] fewer than 10
positions budgeted, and 50 percent of local agencies [had] fewer than seven positions budgeted."
n90
The HEW report went on to note that state and local agency staffing would have to be
increased by 300% in order "to implement the Clean Air Act properly." n91 According to Senator
Muskie (the 1970 Clean Air Act's chief sponsor in the Senate), federal agency staffing would
need to be almost tripled within three years [*920] to implement the Act fully. n92 To meet the
demand for environmental protection experts, the federal government provided sizeable "training
grants" to dozens of academic institutions during the late 1960s and into the 1970s. n93
The deficiencies in available monitoring equipment and agency staffing could lead one to
wonder how any regulatory program to reduce air pollution got off the ground. But the 1970
Clean Air Act was designed in a way that minimized these limitations. Specifically, by focusing
on technological installations to reduce pollution emissions from new stationary sources and
cars, the federal government could minimize monitoring and staffing deficiencies. As noted in
Part III, as long as pollution control technologies were installed and operating, the government
could be assured of some emissions reductions. A year before Congress enacted the Clean Air
Act, Hagevik wrote, "The advantage of [direct regulation] is that it permits the government to
take interim steps even though it has almost no idea of relevant measurements." n94 By contrast,
under an effluent tax system or tradable permit scheme, frequent and precise emission
monitoring would have been necessary to accurately assess taxes or ensure compliance with
permit quotas, which change with each allowance trade. n95 Federal, state, or local officials
certainly stood a better chance of ensuring that pollution-control technologies were installed and
operating than of determining emissions rates from tens of thousands of stationary sources - let
alone millions of automobiles. n96
Continuous monitoring of emissions was simply not feasible in 1970 because of technological
and personnel constraints. n97 According to a 1967 report by the Working Committee on
Economic Incentives of the Federal Coordinating Committee on the Economic Impact of
Pollution [*921] Abatement, "Emission charges and effluent fees are not now entirely feasible
and must await the development of adequate institutions, improved monitoring methods, and
better pollution damage estimates." n98 In 1969 the economist Harold Wolozin concluded that
"formidable detection and monitoring problems are implicit in effluent fee schemes, a problem
compounded by the primitive state of technology in these areas." n99 He quoted from a
presentation William Vickrey made at the 1967 annual meeting of the Air Pollution Control
Association:
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The real problem which advocates of effluent charges must face is the problem of metering, or of
estimating in some way the amount of effluent actually generated by various emitters. Here the
problem of air pollution is seen to be a particularly difficult one in that the number of small
emitters and of the emitters difficult to meter effectively is large and their contribution to the
problem is too great to be ignored. n100

Paul Gerhardt, writing in 1969, agreed that "a fee system could be exceedingly difficult and
costly to administer... Emission measurement technology is presently inadequate to meet the
requirement that a regulatory agency be able to determine with some precision just how much an
individual polluter is contributing to the atmospheric burden." n101 Consequently, regulatory
approaches such as effluent taxes and tradable emissions allowances that were heavily dependent
on regular and precise monitoring were impracticable.
In this respect, the 1970 Clean Air Act appears to be a real-world instantiation of Case 3 from
Part IV.C. As in that hypothetical case, neither tradable permits nor effluent taxes were a feasible
policy option for air pollution control in 1970 because of prohibitive monitoring costs. They may
have been efficient in theory - more efficient, perhaps, than the command-and-control
mechanisms that Congress actually codified - but only if those monitoring costs were ignored.
Indeed, as noted in Part I, many of the economists who have written about the superior efficiency
of effluent taxes and tradable emissions permits have ignored implementation and monitoring
costs. Given that continuous emissions [*922] monitoring would have been necessary to assess
taxes accurately or determine compliance with emissions quotas (pursuant to an emissions
trading scheme); and given the unfeasibility of continuously monitoring emissions from
individual smokestacks and tailpipes in 1970; it was rational - indeed, efficient - for Congress to
rely on command-and-control regulations.
It should be noted, however, that almost from the first day after the 1970 Clean Air Act was
enacted, Congress, President Nixon, and the EPA all began exploring incrementally more
efficient means of attaining the Act's pollution-control goals. Indeed, the entire subsequent
history of federal air pollution control can be viewed as a slow and inconsistent but deliberate
evolution toward greater regulatory efficiency - an evolution that gained momentum as
abatement costs increased and monitoring costs decreased with the improved quality,
availability, and price of monitoring technologies.
Before the 1970 Clean Air Act was a year old, President Nixon proposed a "Clean Air Emission
Charge" on sulfur dioxide emissions and a tax on lead additives in gasoline. n102 Neither of these
proposals was adopted, although Congress held hearings on Nixon's proposed sulfur dioxide
emissions charge (at which the EPA Administrator Russell Train testified strongly in favor of the
charge). n103
President Nixon created the EPA in 1970 by executive order to implement the new Clean Air
Act. By 1972 the EPA began to introduce "economic" instruments of its own device. In fact, the
EPA displayed a surprisingly rapid economic learning curve for a large government bureaucracy
that, at its inception, had little economic expertise. n104 Within [*923] its first decade of
22

existence the Agency innovated (under questionable statutory authority) four mechanisms
designed to enhance the Clean Air Act's efficiency by increasing its flexibility, thereby reducing
compliance costs for regulated industries: offsets, bubbles, netting, and banking. n105 Congress
eventually codified these programs in the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments. In fact, they
constituted the sum total of "market"-based regulations enacted in those Amendments. n106 The
two major new programs created in the 1977 Amendments were the nonattainment and PSD
programs, both of which were discussed in the first part of this Section. These programs were
based on the same command-and-control model upon which Congress relied in 1970.
Path dependence may have been a partial cause, given the high costs to all parties, including
Congress, the EPA, and interest groups (regulated industries, environmental groups, etc.) of
learning new regulatory approaches. n107 According to Keohane et al., "Unfamiliar policy
instruments may require legislators to spend time learning about them before they can provide
substantial support, thereby giving rise to a status [*924] quo bias in favor of the current regime
of command-and-control regulation." n108 Similarly, regulated "firms may simply support the
continuation of the status quo ... because replacing familiar policies with new instruments can
mean the existing expertise within firms becomes less valued." n109
But if path dependence is the explanation for the continuation of command-and-control
instruments in the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, what does that signify? Some might
conclude that the regulatory process, once headed down the path of command-and-control, was
condemned to the inefficiencies of that approach (because of interest group formation, etc.). A
neo-institutional or evolutionary approach, by contrast, might suggest simply that the costs of
adopting alternative approaches, such as effluent taxes or marketable permits, were not yet worth
the benefits.
In any case, by 1977 it was at least becoming more difficult for Congress and the EPA to justify
their lack of attention to economic instruments purely on grounds of technological and economic
constraints. Between 1970 and 1977 the total number of monitors for criteria air pollutants in use
in the U.S. had increased by more than a factor of six; particulate matter monitors had increased
in number from 245 (in 1970) to 1,120 (in 1975); ozone monitors increased from 1 to 321; and
so on. n110 Moreover, the quality and reliability of the monitoring equipment and analytical
techniques for data interpretation were improving. Still, a 1977 report by the National Research
Council "identified the lack of statistical rigor in the design and analysis of most environmental
monitoring networks." n111 Monitoring technologies still were not available to permit the (costeffective) wholesale substitution of market-based regulations for command-and-control. As Marc
Roberts wrote in 1982:

When economists discuss such matters [as emissions trading] they sometimes talk as if
monitoring devices were available to cheaply and reliably record the amount of all pollution
emissions. If that were the case, decisions about whether a source had curtailed its pollution by
the promised amount and whether a new source was emitting no more than the tradeoff
transaction implied could be left to straightforward data [*925] gathering by an enforcement
agent. Unfortunately, such monitoring devices typically are not available ... n112
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But they soon would be.
Meanwhile, staffing deficiencies were substantially alleviated. As of 1979, the federal EPA had
more than 500 employees nationwide working exclusively on clean air programs. States and
local governments, meanwhile, devoted more than 6,500 personnel to air pollution control. n113
But whether this level of staffing was sufficient to meet the increased monitoring, datacollection, and record keeping needs of market-based regulatory programs is unclear. The lack of
any history of environmental monitoring makes it difficult to assess accurately the effect of the
technological and staffing constraints on environmental policy during the 1970s and 1980s.
Nevertheless, the more than 3400 pages of legislative history that accompanied Congress's
enactment of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments disclose that individual legislators were only
marginally more interested in economic instruments in 1977 than in 1970, though they were,
without doubt, better informed. At least the information was readily available to any legislator
who chose to be informed.
In the course of floor debates over the 1977 Amendments, Senator Jake Garn mentioned a
discussion he had with then-President Carter's chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers,
Charles Schultze: "Mr. Schultze and I discussed the idea of pollution charges as an alternative to
the absolute standards approach that has characterized so much of environmental protection in
the United States in recent years. This is an approach which, it seems to me, deserves more
attention than it has received." n114 To that end, Senator Garn inserted into the Congressional
Record an article by Dr. Noel de Nevers entitled Air Pollution Control Philosophies. De Nevers's
article pointed out the theoretical cost advantages of effluent taxes over command-and-control
regulations, such as emissions standards. n115 Similarly, a report on the 1977 Clean Air Act
Amendments by the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee quoted a National
Academy of Sciences study, which found that "an [*926] emissions charge appears to be a well
suited policy instrument for inducing efficient sulfur emissions control... [and] would provide a
powerful spur for the development of more efficient technologies ...." n116
Given that Congress was better informed of the potential cost savings of effluent taxes over
traditional command-and-control regulations, what explains its collective decision in 1977 not to
switch from a predominantly command-and-control regulatory regime to a more flexible system
of effluent taxes or some other "economic" approach? Most economists and policy analysts,
again, adopt a Public Choice explanation: Neither Congress, the EPA, the regulated industries,
nor environmental groups favored a switch away from the familiar command-and-control
regime. n117 No doubt that is part of the explanation. But often ignored is the fact, noted earlier,
that the 1970 Clean Air Act's regulatory regime was achieving significant air pollution
reductions while providing net economic benefits for the country. Consider the following
accurate and balanced account from the legislative history of the 1977 Clean Air Act
Amendments:

In the intervening 6 years [between enactment of the 1970 Clean Air Act and passage of the
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1977 Amendments], significant progress has been achieved in meeting the Nation's air quality
goals, although much remains to be done. Nationally, the air is cleaner now than it was in 1970.
There has been a 25-percent decrease in atmospheric levels of sulfur oxides, and a decrease of
more than 14 percent in particulates - the two major pollutants from industrial sources. Overall,
new cars marketed today are 67 percent cleaner than those sold in 1970.
On the other hand, of the country's 247 air quality control regions, 188 remain out of compliance
with the standards for particulates, 34 for sulfur dioxide, 70 for oxidants and carbon monoxide,
and 16 for nitrogen oxide. Disturbingly, an analysis of these figures reveals that, although most
of these areas surround large cities, some cities have even shown increases in pollution while
significant amounts of air pollution continue to be measured in rural areas.
An industry-by-industry examination of the status of compliance with the Clean Air Act's
requirements shows that although many facilities have been able to make the necessary
adjustments, significant portions of many of them remain in violation of the law's requirements.
Although there are some [*927] 200,000 stationary sources of air pollution in the country, only
15,000 of the 20,000 major sources have been brought into compliance or placed on compliance
schedules - and that most of these violators are the largest polluters and, presumably, those in the
best position to come into compliance...
This is what must be weighed when we consider that 200 of the 480 coal-fired powerplants, 150
of the 200 steel complexes, 19 of 28 nonferrous smelters, 130 of 250 large refineries, 1,000 of
3,500 commercial boilers, and nearly half of the 320 municipal boilers in the country all remain
in violation of the Clean Air Act.
Although the cost of pollution control is often cited by industry as being prohibitive, the cost of
this program to date has not been excessive. Total national expenditures for air pollution control
in 1975 were $ 15.7 billion - around 1 percent of our total output of goods and services - and a
rate which has been constant for the past several years - and less than is being spent on water
pollution control. Meanwhile, it has been conservatively estimated that the cost of air pollution in
health and material damage exceeds $ 25 billion annually. n118

In the absence of information suggesting that the 1970 Clean Air Act was imposing excessive
costs on society (relative to its benefits), what impetus could there have been for Congress to
make the costly switch to some new and untested regulatory regime? No doubt the existing
regime was not optimally efficient, but neither was it nominally inefficient: It produced benefits
in excess of its costs. Nor was it nominally inefficient for Congress to choose in 1977 to continue
along the same path. Indeed, no studies available to Congress in 1977 (and no studies completed
since then) support the proposition that a market-based approach would have produced larger net
social benefits for society in 1977 than the existing command-and-control regime after
accounting for the costs of transition, including increased monitoring and other administrative
costs.
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Between 1977 and 1990 when Congress enacted its most recent set of Clean Air Act
amendments, emissions and ambient concentrations of criteria pollutants continued to fall, n119
but at increased cost to society: Total annualized costs of air pollution control increased (in
constant 1990 dollars) from $ 15.9 billion in 1977 to $ 26 billion in 1990. n120 That is an increase
of 63.5%. But costs did not rise faster than benefits, as Portney [*928] surmised. n121 To the
contrary, the benefits of the Clean Air Act rose faster than the costs.
Figure 7 shows that the net benefit curve of federal air pollution control has been upward-sloping
since Congress enacted the Clean Air Act in 1970. Between 1970 and 1975, the Act produced
estimated net inflation-adjusted benefits - defined as the "mean monetized benefits less
annualized costs for each year" - of $ 341 billion. From 1975 to 1980, estimated net benefits
nearly tripled to $ 909 billion. They rose to $ 1.13 trillion by 1985, and they stood at $ 1.22
trillion by 1990. The rate of increase in net benefits diminished between 1970 and 1990 - rising
by 166% between 1975 and 1980, by 25% between 1980 and 1985, and by only 8% between
1985 and 1990. But a deceleration in the rate of increase is not the same as a decrease.
Throughout the twenty-year period benefits rose faster than costs. Between 1977 and 1990, as
total costs rose by 63.5%, the net benefits of the Clean Air Act increased by 24.5%, despite the
Act's continued heavy reliance on command-and-control mechanisms. n122
One would not know this, however, from reading the legislative history of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990. The ten thousand pages of legislative history that accompanied the
enactment of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments are replete with expressions of concern and
debates over the respective costs and benefits of new and existing air pollution programs. n123 But
why, if the Clean Air Act was providing its greatest ever net benefits in 1990? There is no certain
answer, but several factors may have played a role.
First, no one in 1990 really knew whether the Act was producing net costs or benefits; indeed,
that is why Congress, in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, ordered the EPA to undertake a
cost-benefit analysis of the Act. n124 But everyone knew that, whatever the benefits, the price tag
of the Act was rising. n125 Legislators may have mistakenly assumed, like
[*929]
Figure 7: Mean estimate of increase in net benefits of the Clean Air Act, 1970-1990, in billions
of inflation-adjusted 1990 dollars. Source: Office of Air & Radiation, U.S. Envtl. Protection
Agency, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970-1990, at 56 tbl. 18 (1997)
[SEE FIGURE IN ORIGINAL]
Portney, n126 that marginal costs were quickly overtaking marginal benefits. Had this actually
been the case, it would have confirmed Hagevik's 1969 prediction that policy makers would
become more interested in the costs of control "as the point of equality between incremental
control costs and [*930] incremental damages is approached." n127 But as already noted, in 1990
the Clean Air Act was still providing increasing net benefits. Nevertheless, in the legislative
process, perception is as important as fact. Congressional interest in efficiency-enhancing
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policies increased as legislators and others perceived that additional increments of pollution
control could be obtained only at net cost to society.
But there is more to the story than congressional perceptions of the costs and benefits of air
pollution control. By 1990 environmental abatement and monitoring technologies had improved
to a point where economic instruments, such as effluent taxes and marketable pollution
permitting, were finally becoming administratively feasible. Continuous emission monitors
(CEMs), the first of which appeared just two years before Congress enacted the 1977 Clean Air
Act Amendments, had become widely available and affordable by 1990. As Jahnke wrote in
1993, "CEM systems ... advanced considerably over the past 15 years, with improved sampling
techniques, analyzers, and data processing systems being integrated to meet the challenges posed
by new requirements." n128 By 1991 the U.S. government was requiring continuous monitoring at
twenty-four categories of sources subject to NSPSs under section 111 of the Clean Air Act. In
addition, CEM was required for all electric power generators regulated under the acid rain
program, which Congress created in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. n129 CEM systems
were not yet available for all air pollutants and sources, n130 but they made economic instruments
a feasible (i.e., cost-effective) and, in some cases, preferable (i.e., more efficient) policy choice
for certain combinations of pollutants and sources.
Meanwhile, the EPA was growing more open to the use of market mechanisms. The Agency had
been preparing economic analyses (Regulatory Impact Analyses or RIAs) of its major
regulations since its inception. n131 And it had grown comfortable with cost-benefit analysis as
[*931] a tool of environmental policy. As a 1987 EPA report noted, "Environmentalists often
fear that economic analysis will lead to less strict environmental regulations in an effort to save
costs, but our study reveals that the opposite is just as often the case." n132 In addition, in 1987
the EPA wrapped up a small-scale and temporary but highly successful experiment in tradable
rights to lead-content in gasoline. n133 By the 1990s the EPA was employing more than 100
economists. All this gave the EPA greater economic expertise than any other federal health and
safety agency. n134 Heightened economic expertise, plus the increasing availability of advanced
emissions monitoring technologies, may have made the EPA (and Congress) more comfortable
with experimental economic approaches to pollution control, like emissions trading.
In addition, state environmental agencies were better staffed and equipped in 1990 than they had
been in 1970 or 1977: "In constant 1992 dollars, air quality expenditures [by state agencies] went
from $ 249 million in 1971 to $ 516 million in 1994." n135 This may have alleviated federal
concerns about the states' abilities to monitor and enforce federal environmental programs.
Given the increased information about market mechanisms for environmental protection, the
innovation of new technologies to monitor emissions adequately, improved funding of state
agencies, the development of agency economic expertise, and rising concern about the costs of
environmental regulations, it is not particularly surprising that Congress, in the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments, began experimenting on a larger scale with economic approaches such as
emissions trading. Even though the Clean Air Act was continuing to yield net social benefits, the
reasons for preferring command-and-control regulations over [*932] economic mechanisms particularly concerning monitoring and enforcement - were waning. At least with respect to
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certain specific air pollution problems, the theoretical advantages of market-based approaches
could finally be realized.
The 1990 Amendments included the first large-scale experiment ever conducted with emissions
trading in its new acid rain program. n136 Senator Baucus, a primary sponsor of the 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments, clearly expressed the experimental nature of the program:

Many of the provisions in this bill are new ideas.
Allowance trading in the acid rain title. We think it will work. We thought it through as well as
we could. We are not sure it will work as well as we had intended. Therefore, there will be many
adjustments, modifications and refinements as we work with and experiment with the acid rain
portion of this bill. n137

Other legislators and President Bush referred to the emissions trading scheme as "innovative,"
"novel," and "never tried ... before." n138
So far the experiment has worked better than anyone expected. By November 1995, 23 million
sulfur dioxide allowances worth $ 2 billion had been transferred in more than 600 market
transactions. n139 The first allowances sold in 1992 for between $ 250 and $ 400 a piece; the
average fell to $ 68 in 1996, but rebounded to $ 107 in 1997. n140 In addition to these transfers,
many sources have saved and banked excess allowances for future use when further reductions
are required beginning in the year 2000. The result has been a greater than expected reduction in
sulfur dioxide emissions and a 10% to 25% reduction in acid precipitation in the Northeast. n141
Total emissions in 1995 were 5.3 million tons, 39% below the legislatively-set ceiling and more
than 50% below 1980 emission levels. n142
[*933] Economically, the acid rain program's sulfur dioxide emissions trading program has
been "a terrific bargain," n143 producing substantial net benefits for society. n144 The lowest
estimates of its annual health benefits - $ 12 billion - are four times higher than the highest
estimates of annual program costs. n145 A key question, of course, is whether the acid rain
program's emission trading mechanism increased net benefits over what they would have been
under direct regulation. Total cost savings are difficult to estimate, but must be substantial.
Consider that just four utilities (Central Illinois Public Service, Illinois Power Company, Duke
Power, and Wisconsin Electric Power Company) have estimated their aggregate savings from
purchasing allowances rather than installing scrubbers at $ 706 million. n146 This figure is not far
below the total annual costs of compliance with Phase I sulfur dioxide emission-reduction
requirements, estimated at $ 836 million. n147
One important but oft-neglected point concerning the acid rain program is Congress's insistence
on continuous emission monitoring "to preserve the orderly functioning of the allowance system,
and ... ensure the emissions reductions contemplated by this [program]." n148 This statutory
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language reflects two critical perceptions. First, "unlike other control requirements of the Clean
Air Act, utility emissions of sulfur dioxide and [nitrogen oxides] are capable of verification in a
cost-effective manner through use of continuous emission monitors." Second, "the requirements
for CEMS is the linchpin in this title for without good emissions data, a problem that has
hampered enforcement of the Act to date, no allowance or emissions trading scheme can
affectively [sic] operate." n149 The implication is that absent the technical capability to precisely
measure emissions "in a cost-effective manner," emission trading really cannot be said to be
feasible, let alone more efficient than direct regulation. It is the existence of cost-effective
technologies for [*934] measuring sulfur dioxide emissions that has made the emission trading
program workable.
So far, the EPA's experiment in large-scale emission trading has been an unmitigated success
from both environmental and economic perspectives. It proves that economic instruments in
some cases can achieve environmental goals at less cost than direct regulation. And it marks an
incremental evolution of federal air pollution control toward efficiency-enhancing economic
instruments. n150 It does not, however, signify a wholesale shift away from command-andcontrol.
Congress hardly forsook direct regulation in 1990. Not only did it maintain existing commandand-control programs; it even added some new ones. In fact, one of those new programs was
more dubious economically than just about anything Congress had ever before enacted. Section
249 of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments required automakers to sell at least 150,000 "cleanfuel vehicles" (i.e., electric cars) per year beginning in 1996, and sales were to rise to 300,000
per year by 1999 - as if the industry could stipulate consumer preferences. n151 This exemplifies
the claim from Part III that policies evolve only incrementally and nonuniformly in the wake of
economic, institutional, and technological changes.
One question, however, remains: Have the 1990 Amendments on the whole increased, reduced,
or not significantly affected the overall efficiency of the Clean Air Act? As Congress was
considering the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Portney predicted that their costs would
exceed their benefits by between $ 4 billion and $ 30 billion per year. n152 But a recent empirical
study by Hahn found that the benefits of all major (final) Clean Air Act regulations - twenty-five
in all - promulgated by the EPA between 1990 and mid-1995 exceeded their costs by almost $ 88
[*935] billion (although, on Hahn's numbers, only ten of them would have passed
individualized cost-benefit tests). n153 Can it be that the Clean Air Act is still growing more rather
than less efficient, despite its continued heavy reliance on command-and-control regulations?
VI. Implications and Conclusion
According to the standard economic account, command-and-control regulations are inefficient,
and should grow increasingly inefficient over time as additional pollution control becomes more
costly. But the best available numbers on the Clean Air Act do not bear this out. Something must
be wrong with either the numbers, the standard argument, or both.
No doubt the numbers are not perfect; estimations of environmental costs and especially
environmental benefits are fraught with uncertainty and subjectivity, especially in the valuations
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of non-priced goods and bads and the selection of discount rates. But it would take a clever
accountant indeed to make the numbers show that the Clean Air Act imposes net costs on
society. As the EPA has explained, "the benefits of the Clean Air Act and associated control
programs [between 1970 and 1990] substantially exceeded costs. Even considering the large
number of important uncertainties permeating each step of the analysis, it is extremely unlikely
that the converse could be true." n154 If the EPA's mean estimate of net benefits between 1970
and 1990 ($ 21.7 trillion compounded at five percent) n155 were too high by a factor of 100, the
Clean Air Act still would have yielded $ 217 billion in net social benefits. n156 So, even if there is
something terribly wrong with the numbers, there must also be something wrong with the claim
that command-and-control is an inherently inefficient policy tool.
Specifically, standard economic accounts of the comparative efficiency of alternative regulatory
regimes are insensitive to historical, institutional, and technological contexts. Most importantly,
they tend to assume "perfect (and, incidentally, costless) monitoring," n157 or they assume that
monitoring costs are the same regardless of the control [*936] regime that is chosen. As shown
in this Article, both of these assumptions are unrealistic, and they often skew comparative costbenefit analyses of alternative regulatory regimes. When institutional and technological costs are
considered, command-and-control regulations appear neither inherently inefficient nor invariably
less efficient than theoretical economic approaches, such as effluent taxes or emissions trading
schemes. Indeed, in some cases, such as those involving very high monitoring costs, commandand-control can be more efficient than market mechanisms. n158 However, the goal of this study
has not been to question the efficiency-enhancing potential of effluent taxes or emissions trading
programs. Indeed, as demonstrated in Part V, the Clean Air Act's large-scale experiment with
emissions-trading in the acid rain program has been an unmitigated success, producing greater
than expected emissions reductions at lower than expected cost. This success story will
undoubtedly encourage Congress and the EPA to use economic instruments more widely in the
future. Indeed, many are now calling on Congress to transform radically environmental policy,
advocating abandonment of command-and-control in favor of the "next generation" of
efficiency-enhancing market-based controls. n159
Rena Steinzor has cautioned against such a radical transformation: "Without dramatically
expanding the resources available to federal and state regulators, and without placing
challenging, new demands on pollution sources to track emissions and research their
toxicological effects, the shift to the "next generation' of regulatory policy is likely to result in
severe degradation of environmental quality." n160 This Article's analysis suggests that caution is,
indeed, warranted. As demonstrated here, command-and-control mechanisms have reduced air
pollution, and they have done so (for the most part) efficiently. Moreover, market-based
solutions are not well-suited for all institutional and technological contexts, particularly where
monitoring costs are exorbitant. In that circumstance, command-and-control regulations may be
both more effective and more efficient. To the extent they are replaced by market mechanisms, it
should only be after careful, case-by-case examinations of [*937] expected costs and benefits,
including implementation and monitoring costs.
On the other hand, this analysis also suggests that the radical policy changes Steinzor fears are
unlikely to occur. Like other institutions in society, those of environmental protection (including
the regulatory regime itself) tend to evolve slowly, incrementally, and inconsistently. And in this
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case there is no reason to anticipate deviation from that tendency because the current Clean Air
Act continues to provide substantial and apparently increasing net benefits for society.
Consequently, there is little substantive (as opposed to political or ideological) reason for
Congress radically to amend the Act. n161
Not all environmental laws have been as efficient as the Clean Air Act. By all accounts, the costs
of the Clean Water Act (another predominantly command-and-control regime), for example,
have outweighed its benefits. n162 But it is one thing to note that command-and-control-based
regulatory regimes are sometimes inefficient; it is another to assert that they are inherently so.
n163
This Article does not dispute the former assertion, but the analysis suggests that the later
assertion is erroneous.
So the question becomes, how and when should policy makers employ command-and-control
rather than market mechanisms? As Stavins notes, "There is no simple answer, no policy
panacea. Inevitably, case-by-case examinations are required." n164 In large measure, the choice of
regulatory regime depends on the goals and concerns of policy-makers. n165 However, the
analysis of this Article suggests that where abatement costs are relatively low and monitoring
costs are relatively high, command-and-control is likely to be at least as efficient and effective as
effluent taxes or a tradable emissions program. In the obverse case of relatively high abatement
costs and relatively low monitoring costs, market mechanisms are likely to be more efficient. Of
course, there are many other economic, institutional, and technological [*938] variables that
can affect the comparison of regulatory options, which is precisely why case-by-case
examinations are required.
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